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[Crim. No. 11721. In Bank. Mar. 18, 1968.] 
In re WILLIAM JOSEPH FINLEY on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus - Grounds for ltelief - Adjudication of Ha-
bitual Criminality.-A habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to 
attack a 1946 determination of habitual criminality on the 
ground that a 1932 foreign burglary conviction was not an of-
fense the minimum elements of which met the California defi-
nition of burglary or of any other crime listed in Pen. Code, 
§ 644, defining habitual criminals, where the only available 
record of the foreign conviction showed that the conviction 
could have been based on acts not constituting burglary in 
California and that the least adjudicated elements of the 
foreign offense were not equivalent to the elements of the 
similarly denominated California offense enumerated in Pen. 
Code, § 644. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ denied; order to show cause discharged. 
William Joseph Finley, in pro. per., and Charles Y. Boegge-
man, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Peti-
tioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, 
Assistant Attorney General, Raymond M. Momboisse and 
Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Respond-
,ent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1946 a jury found petitioner guilty 
of first degree robbery. The information alleged and petitioner 
admitted prior convictions of burglary in the State of Wash-
ington in 1932 and first degree robbery in California in 1938, 
with service of a term of imprisonment for each. The Los 
Angeles County Superior Court adjudged petitioner an habit-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 41 j Am.Jur., Habeas Cor-
pus (1st ed § 59). 
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ual criminal and sentenced him to life imprisonment. (Pen. 
Code, § 644, subd. (a).)1 Petitioner did not appeal.2 
[1] In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner attacks 
the determination of habitual criminality. He contends that 
the determination must fall beeause the 1932 Washington 
burglary conviction was not of an offense the minimum ele-
ments of which meet the California definition of burglary or 
of any other crime listed in section 644. Petitioner invokes 
propositions enunciated over vigorous dissents in In ,.e 
McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d. 264, [176 P.2d 40], and In re 
Seeley (1946) 29 Cal.2d 294 [176 P.2d. 241. that permit the 
habeas corpus petitioner who challenges an habitual criminal 
adjudication a wider scope of review than is available when 
the writ is sought to review a jUdgment of conviction of 
crime. The McVickcrs majority concluded at page 270 that 
"the writ can consistently be made available to a priSoner 
who has been' adjudged an l1abitual criminal although in truth 
and fact he is not, without so enlarging its scope as to make it 
in effeet . . . a writ of error to review the correctness of a 
convietion. " 
Although Penal Code section 1025 pr.Jvides that a defend-
ant's admission that he has suffered a previous conviction 
charged in the accusatory pleading" must, unless withdrawn 
by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having 
suffered such previous conviction in all subsequent proceed-
ings," under the McVickcrs-Sceley line of cases the admitted 
IPenal Code section 644, subdivision (a), provided in 1946, as it now 
provides, that "Every person convicted in this State of the crime of 
robbery [or other naUled felollies] .•. who shall have been previously 
twice convicted upon charges separately brought and tried, and who shall 
have served separate terms therefor in any state prison ••• either in 
this State or elsewhere, of the crime of robbery, burglary, [or other 
named felonies] .•. shall be adjudged a [sic] habitual criminal and 
shall he punished by imprisonment in tile state prison for life." In addi· 
tion to an express life sentence an habitual criminal adjudication carries 
witll it a 8ub .. tantial increase in time that must be served before the 
cJ<>fc)ulant becomes eligihile for parole. (Pen. Code, §§ 3047,3047.5,3048, 
3048.5.) 
Since 19:17 Penal Code section 6G8 has provided that one who has been 
convicted in another state of an offense that, "if committed within this 
State," could have been punished under the laws of this state by im· 
prisonment in the st.atc prison" is punishable for any subsequent crime 
committe-d within this State in the manner prescribed [in section 644] 
... as if such prior cO)H"iction had taken place in a court of this State." 
2Pet itioner 's codefendants appealed and the judgments against them 
were affirmed in People v. Dunlop (1947) 79 Ca1.App.2d 207 r179 P.2d 
658]. Later pet.itioner joined his codefendants in an unsuccessful coram 
nohis proceeiling. (People v. Dllnlop (1951) 102 Ca1.App.2d 314, 316·317 
[2:l7 P.2d 281].) 
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"fact of his having suffered such previous conviction" is not 
a conclusive admission that "such previous conyiction" was 
in law or fact of a felony listed in section 644. The McVickcrs-
Seeley extension of habeas corpus permits the petitioner who 
has been adjudged an habitual criminal to go outside the rec-
ord of the California prosecution that resulted in the 
determination of habitual criminality and to bring in the rec-
ord of the challenged foreign prior conviction; he is nlIowed 
to call the attention of the habeas corpus court to the law of 
the state where it was suffered; and he is allowed thus to show 
that the minimum adjudicated elements of the foreign crime 
are not those of a California felony enumerated in section 644. 
(In re Wolfson (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 20, 23,24 [180 P.2d 326] ; 
In re McV1'cket's, supm, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 267; In re Seeley. 
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 300.) The McVickers-Seeley line of 
cases holds also that unless the record before the habeas cor-
pus court establishes the adjudicated elements of the previous 
offense, the court will assume that the prior conviction was for 
the least offense punishable under the foreign statute. (In re 
McVickers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 278; see People v. Burns 
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 480, 483 [5 Cal.Rptr. 301] ; People v. 
Richardson (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 540 [169 P.2d H).) 
Here the only record of the 1932 'Vashington conviction 
now available, an authentieated copy of the judgment, sen-
tence, and commitment, shows that petitioner was convicted of 
second degree burglary on his plea of guilty. Second degree 
burglary as defined by 'Vashington statute is committed by 
entry with intent to commit any crime, whether misdemeanor 
or felony, or by innocent entry followed by the commission of 
any crime and breaking out. (Rem. Compo Stat., § 2579.)3 In 
California, however, the crime of burglary is committed by 
entry "with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any 
felony .... " (Pen. Code, § 459.) Thus petitioner has estab-
lished that his Washington convietion could have been based 
on acts not constituting burglary in California and he has 
therefore shown that "the least adjudicated elements of the 
Washington offense are not equiva!ent to the elements of the 
similarly denominated California offense enumerated in sec-
3Seetion 257!J: "Every person wllo, with intent to commit some crime 
therein shall, under cireumst:lllces not amounting to burglary in the first 
degree, enter the dwelling· house of another or brealt and enter, or, having 
committed a crime therein, shall break out of, any building ... wherein 
any property is kept . . . shall be guilty of bmglary in the second 
degree ...• " 
) 
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tion 644 of the Penal Code and the Washington conviction is 
not competent to support a determination of habitual crimi-
nality under that section." (In re Pearson (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 
871,876 [186 P.2d 401].) 
The Attorney General asks us to overrule the McVickers-
Seeley line of cases and to adopt the rule urged in the dissent-
ing opinion in Seeley, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 303 (see also the dissent 
in McVickers, 29 Ca1.2d at p. 281] that when an adjudication 
of habitual criminality is attacked by habeas corpus on the 
ground that the prior convictions were of crimes that do not 
meet the definition of offenses listed in section 644, review 
extends only to the trial court's jurisdiction to make such 
determination and is limited to the face of the record in the 
criminal proceeding that resulted in the determination. That 
is the normal scope of inquiry on habeas corpus when as here 
there is no issue of a fundamental constitutional deprivation. 
(See generally In re Jackson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 500, 503-504 
[39 Cal.Rptr. 220, 393 P.2d 420]; In re Raner (1963) 59 
Ca1.2d 635, 639 [30 Cal.Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638]; Neal v. 
State of Oalifornia (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17 [9 Cal.Rptr. 
607, 357 P.2d 839] ; In re McInturf!" (1951) 37 Cal.2d 876, 880 
[236 P.2d 574] j In re BeU (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 492-494 [122 
P.2d 22].) Whatever may have been the merits of the exten-
sion of the Scope of babeas eorpus as annoll.DC:Cld by JlcYieJurs 
and Seeley in 1946,· however, their holdings have not led to 
reckless and ill-considered use of the writ to impair the final-
ity of judgments j the application of their roles as to the 
extent of post-conviction collateral review has been limited to 
"cases presenting the same narrow questions that were raised 
by McVickers and Seeley themselves. 
The Attorney General urges that the McVickers-Seeley line 
of cases improperly permits relief without regard to estab-
lished rules of policy (see In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47, 
51-52 [56 Cal.Rptr. 824, 423 P.2d 976] j In re Shipp (1965) 62 
Cal.2d 547, 553 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]) that require 
the applicant for habeas corpus to excuse his failure to pre-
sent his contention at trial and on appeal and to explain his 
delay in raising it on habeas corpus. The McVickers-Seeley 
use of the writ, however, does not permit the opening or 
4Those deciBions did not originate the use of the writ that we are con-
sidering here. They accepted and presented a rationale for an extension 
of the writ that had already been made. (See eases cited in McVicker-II, 
29 Cal.2d at p. 274, dissent at pp. 288-289, and 8eelell. 29 Cal.2d at p. 298, 
di88ent at p. 306.) 
) 
) 
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reopening of questions calling for resolution on the basis of 
the testimony of witnesses who may have died or disappeared 
or whose memories have faded. Nor does a collateral attack on 
an habitual criminal adjudication on McVickcrs-Seeley 
grounds involve difficulties with respect to records of past 
convictions comparable to those raised by a constitutional 
attack based on the retrospective application of Gideon v. 
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 
93 A.L.R.2d 733]. (See In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3, 8 [48 
Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913].) The fact that an accused 
suffered a foreign conviction of a crime is made officially of 
record at the time and place of such conviction, and the law 
of the jurisdiction where he suffered it is judicially noticed. 
(In re McVickers, supra, 29 Cal.2d 264, 272, 276, 287; Pen. 
Code, § 969b; Evid. Code, § § 453, 1530.) The least adjudi-
cated elements of the prior conviction remain the same 
whether it is questioned in the trial court at the time of the 
determination of habitual criminality or on habeas corpus 
after such determination has become final. Neither the People 
inor the defendant can go behind those adjudicated elements 
lin an attempt to show that he committed a greater, lesser, or 
different offense. (In re Norcutt (1948) 31 Cal.2d 743, 744 
[192 P.2d 453J; In re Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.2d 20, 31; In re 
XcY~keTs, supra, 29 Cal.2d 264, 2;6_ J 
The Attorney General argues, however, that if petitioner 
had questioned the sufficiency of the 1932 Washington convic· 
tion in 1946 when it was used as a basis of the habitual 
criminal adjudication, the People might have been able to 
prove by then existing but since vanished Washington records 
that in fact petitioner's conviction was of an offense equiva-
lent to California second degree burglary. Since the only 
available record of the foreign conviction shows merely that it 
was for a named Washington offense, McVickers does not 
require the petitioner to bear the normal burden of one who 
seeks habeas corpus relief by proving that the Washington 
conviction was insufficient; instead he makes out its insuffi-
ciency simply by standing on the decisionally established 
assumption that the conviction was for the least offense pun-
ishable under the Washington statute. When we examine the 
applications that have been made of this anomalous rule giv-
ing the habeas corpus petitioner the benefit of a doubt in 
order to sustain his attack on the final determination of 
habitual criminality, we find only a narrowly limited change 
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in the burden of proof on collateral attack upon a prior con-
viction used to increase punishment, not a general principle 
requiring the People repeatedly to bear the burden of defend-
ing final judgments of conviction. 
\Ye are not imprcsscd by the argument that the Seeley and 
McVickers rules have operated unfairly to the state or con-
ferred bonuses on prisoners for delay in attacking habitual 
criminal adjudications. At least since the 1927 amendment of 
Penal Code section 668, referring spccifically to section 644 
(fn. 1, supra), prosecutors have had ample warning that they 
should be prepared to support a foreign conviction charged as 
the basis for the increased punishment attendant on habitual 
criminality by proof that it was of an offense that, if com-
mitted in California, would be punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison. The 1927 aUH'Jl(lment of section 668, consid-
ered with sectiQn 644, advised prosecuting attorneys as well as 
defendants that an offense denominated a "felony" in 
another jurisdiction is not necessarily a crime that, if com-
mitted in California, would be punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison, and that the elements of an offense that 
another jurisdiction calls by a name listed in section 644 are 
not necessarily those of a similarly named California offense. 
(See In rc McVicket·s, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 264, and dissent at p. 
290.) Beginning in 1934 decisions on appeal tested the ele-
ments of prior foreign convictions underlying habitual 
criminal adjudications in the manner later approved in the 
McVickc1's-Seeley line of eases on habeas corpus, that is, by 
reference to the records and judicially noticed law of the 
jurisdiction where the prior cOllyiction was suffered. (People 
v. Pace (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 464, 466 [38 CatRptr. 202]; 
People v. Hayes (1934) 3 Ca1.App.2d 59, 63 [39 P.2d 213] ; 
but see People v. Shaw (1934) 137 Cal.App. 533, 536-537 [30 
P.2d 1031].) The McVic7.:ers-Sccley usc of habeas corpus was 
anticipated by decisions of the Courts of Appeal (In re Con-
nell (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 360, 361 [156 P.2d 483]; In re 
Howard (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 164 [158 P.2d 408]; In re 
1'hompson (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 747 [165 P.2d 533) ; In re 
Kingsbury (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 959, 962 [170 P.2d 82) 
and opinions of the Attorney General. (6 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gcn. 
36 (1945); 3 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 198 (1944).) It should have 
been apparent that' 'where prior convictions are alleged the 
People should be prepared to prove them" (People v. Parra 
(1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 93, 95 [13 Cal.Rptr. 828) and to 
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Morton 
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(1953) 41 Cal.2d 536, 539 [261 P.2d 523].) Nevertheless pros-
ecutors alleged and defendants admitted prior convictions 
that, although apparently sufficient to support an adjudica-
tion of habitual criminality, were in fact and in law not of 
crimes that met the California definitions of the offenses listed 
in section 644. Of course defendants were mistaken in per-
mitting habitual criminal determinations based on such 
insufficient prior convictions to stand without prompt chal-
lenge, but prosecutors were mistaken in persisting in their use 
of foreign prior convictions that did not meet California 
standards. II 
Application of the McVickers-Seeley rules in reported cases 
decided since their announcement dispels any notion that 
recidivists deliberately delayed challenging habitual crim-
inal determination in the hope that a belated attack might 
give them some advantage. For several years after jJ[ c-
Vickers and Seeley were decided in December 1946 pris-
oners invoked them quite often, usually successfully6 but 
occasionally to no avail,7 The proceeding now before us is the 
:first reported case since In re Martin (1952) supra, 115 Cal. 
App.2d 188, invoking the rules of McVickers and Seeley on a 
collateral attack in the precise factual situation that those 
rules were designed to correct. This decisional history does 
not suggest that repetitive offenders have been taking unfair 
liThe California Appellate Reports before McVickers and Seeley show 
instances of foreign prior convictions underlying adjudications of 
habitual criminality that were corrected on appeal or habeas corpus 
because the foreign offense amounted to no more than larceny of $10 
(People v. Pace (1934) Il'Upra, 2 Cal.Apl).2d 464, 466), larceny of some 
amount in excess of $15 (People v. Hayes (1934) Il'Upra, 3 Cal.App.2d 
59,63), driving an automobile with knowledge that it was stolen (People 
v. Lohr (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [82 P.2d 615]), breaking and 
entering a building at night with no specific intent (People v. McChesney 
(1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 36, 41 [102 P.2d 455]), driving an automobile 
without the owner's permission (I'll re Connell (1945) supra, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 360, 361, 365), theft of clothing of the value of $45 (I'll re 
Howard (1945) Il'Upra, 69 Cal.App.2d 164), larceny of $35 (I'll re Thomp' 
Bon (1946) Il'Upra, 72 Cal.App.2d 747), and obtaining $10 by false pre· 
t.enses (I'll re Kingsbury (1946) supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 959, 962). 
8In re Harincar (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 403, 406, fn. 2 [176 P.2d 58]; I'll re 
Pear80n (1947) supra, 30 Ca1.2d 871, 876; I'll re Bramble (1947) 31 
Cal.2d 43, 52 [187 P.2d 411]; I'll re Galloway (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 880 
[178 P.2d 469]; I'll re Lamey (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 284, 288·289 [193 
P.2d 66]; I'll re Mead (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 537 [206 P.2d 1091); 
I'll re Page (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 218 [221 P.2d 167]; I'll re Martin 
(1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 188, 191 [251 P.2d 745J. 
7In re Wolfson (1947) Il'Upra, 30 Cal.2d 20; I'll re Tedford (1948) 
31 Ca1.2d 693, 695 [192 P.2d 3]; I'll re Norcutt (1948) supra, 31 Ca1.2d 
743, 744; I'll re Schunke (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 588, 590 [184 P.2d 700]. 
, . 
II I,. 
I , . 
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advantage of the State of California under McVickers and 
8eeuy. The rules of those cases designed to permit review of 
erroneous determinations of habitual criminality have not 
been extended to factual situations other than those that they 
were intended to correct, and we decline to overrule them. 
Petitioner also attacks his 1938 and 1947 California convic-
tions by averments directed to claimed denial of the right to 
eounsel. The reeords of those California proceedings refute his 
contentions that he was denied that right. 
The 1946 adjudication of habitual criminality (Los Angeles 
County Superior Court No. 105382) is set aside and the Adult 
Authority is directed to disregard it. Petitioner, however, is 
properly imprisoned under indeterminate sentences with max-
imum terlDS of life imprisonment. The order to show cause is 
discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
denied. 
Peters, J.; Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., 
and Peek, J.,. concurred. : 
eRt)tired A880ciate Justice of the Supreme Oour~ littinr ullder assip· 
1Jl.m~ bl Ule Cb.irmlUl of till! Judicial Oouncil. . 
